I am a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Bristol.
From January 2025, I will be the Principal Investigator of the ERC Starting Grant project Expressing Value in Language (EVIL, No. 101162444).
My research is primarily in the philosophy of language, formal semantics and pragmatics. I also work on topics in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, especially when they intersect with linguistic issues. My current research interests include: information structure, quantifier expressions, quantifier variance, natural language truth predicates, slurs, verbal and metalinguistic disputes, category mistakes, attitude reports, gradable adjectives, and evaluative discourse.
- One “True” Meaning ±
2024. Ergo. 11 (29): 769-802.
Some words express different meanings in different contexts, such as “bank” and “I.” Linguistic alethic pluralists claim that “true” is another such word. This is a surprising thesis that holds implications for debates about the nature of truth. Yet it is in need of careful elaboration and evaluation. I describe several versions of linguistic alethic pluralism, alongside tests that natural language theorists use to identify different types of meaning variation. I also consider empirical studies that have recently targeted the use of “true.” I conclude that there is currently no evidence for linguistic alethic pluralism, and unlikely to be any forthcoming.
- Good People are Not Like Good Knives ±
2024. Noûs. 58 (3): 644-668.
Is anything good simpliciter? And can things count as 'good' independent of the context in which 'good' is used? Traditionally, a number of meta-ethicists have given positive answers. But more recently, some philosophers have used observations based on natural language to argue that things can only count as 'good' relative to ends and contextual thresholds. I will use work from contemporary linguistics to argue that 'good' is ambiguous, and that it has a moral disambiguation that attributes a fixed degree of goodness. This implies that things can count as 'good' simpliciter, independent of context. Not only does this result provide support for the traditional view, but it also vindicates some aspects of the more recent view.
- Category Mistakes Electrified ±
2023. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
Occurrences of sentences that are traditionally considered category mistakes, such as 'The red number is divisible by three', tend to elicit a sense of oddness in assessors. In attempting to explain this oddness, existing accounts in the philosophical literature commonly claim that occurrences of such sentences are associated with a defect or phenomenology unique to the class of category mistakes. It might be thought that recent work in experimental psycholinguistics—in particular, the recording of event-related brain potentials (patterns of voltage variation in the brain)—holds the potential to shed new light on this debate. I review the relevant experimental results, before arguing that they present advocates of accounts of category mistakes with a dilemma: either the uniqueness claims should be rejected, or the experimental technique in question cannot be used to test existing accounts of category mistakes in the manner that philosophers might hope.
- Experimenting with Every American King ±
2023. Natural Language Semantics. 31: 349–387.
The standard contemporary semantics for 'every' predict the truth of occurrences of sentences with restrictors that denote the empty set, such as 'Every American king lives in New York'. The literature on empty restrictors has been concerned with explaining a particular violation of this prediction: many assessors consider empty-restrictor sentences to be odd rather than valued, and they are apparently more likely to do so when such sentences include determiners like 'every' as opposed to those like 'no'. Empirical investigation of this issue is overdue, and I present the results of three experimental surveys. The first unexpected outcome is that there is no evidence of a contrast in assessors' tendencies to judge sentences to be odd based on determiner type. An additional surprising result is that those assessors who assign a truth value to sentences where 'every' combines with an empty restrictor overwhelmingly assign the value false. The full results do not fit straightforwardly with any existing account.
- Not Half True ±
2023. Mind. 132 (525): 84-112.
The word 'true' shows some evidence of gradability. For instance, there are cases where truth-bearers are described as 'slightly true', 'completely true' or 'very true'. Expressions that accept these types of modifiers are analysed in terms of properties that can be possessed to a greater or lesser degree. If 'true' is genuinely gradable, then it would follow that there are degrees of truth. It might also follow that 'true' is context sensitive, like other gradable expressions. Such conclusions are difficult to reconcile with most existing theories: deflationists and inflationists alike tend to reject the thesis that one true truth-bearer can have more or less truth than another. Based on work in natural language, I argue that 'true' is not a genuinely gradable expression. I also provide an explanation of the apparent evidence for gradability. Hence there is no reason to think that there is a truth property that comes in degrees.
- Focus on Slurs ±
2023. (Co-authored with Ashley Shaw). Mind & Language. 38 (3): 693-710.
Slurring expressions display puzzling behaviour when embedded, such as under negation and in attitude and speech reports. On one hand, they frequently appear to retain their characteristic qualities, such as offensiveness and propensity to derogate. On the other hand, it is sometimes possible to understand them as lacking these qualities. A theory of slurring expressions should explain this variability. We develop an explanation that deploys the linguistic notion of focus. Our proposal is that a speaker can conversationally implicate metalinguistic claims about the aptness of a focused slurring expression. The inclusion of a sentential operator in the sentence (e.g., negation) affects the aptness claim conveyed, resulting in the availability of non-pejorative metalinguistic construals (e.g., that the slurring expression is not apt for certain purposes). The resulting explanation of variability relies on independently motivated mechanisms and is compatible with any theory of slurring expressions.
- Paradox and Context Shift ±
2023. Philosophical Studies (Special Issue). 180 (5-6): 1539-1557.
The Liar sentence L, which reads 'L is not true', can be used to produce an apparently valid argument proving that L is not true and that L is true. There has been increasing recognition of the appeal of contextualist solutions to the Liar paradox. Contextualist accounts hold that some step in the reasoning induces a context shift that causes the apparently contradictory claims to occur at different contexts. Attempts at identifying the most promising contextualist account often rely on timing arguments, which seek to isolate a step at which the context cannot be claimed to have shifted or must have shifted. The literature contains a number of timing arguments that draw incompatible conclusions about the location of the context shift. I argue that no existing timing arguments succeed. An alternative strategy for assessing contextualist accounts evaluates the plausibility of their explanations of why the context shifts. However, even this strategy yields no clear verdict about which contextualist account is the most promising. I conclude that there are some grounds for optimism and for pessimism about the potential to adequately motivate contextualism.
- The Liar Without Relativism ±
2023. Erkenntnis. 88 (1): 267–288.
Some in the recent literature have claimed that a connection exists between the Liar paradox and semantic relativism: the view that the truth values of certain occurrences of sentences depend on the contexts at which they are assessed. Sagi (2017) argues that contextualist accounts of the Liar paradox are committed to relativism, and Rudnicki and Lukowski (forthcoming) propose a new account that they classify as relativist. I argue that a full understanding of how relativism is conceived within theories of natural language shows that neither of the purported connections can be maintained. There is no reason why a solution to the Liar paradox needs to accept relativism.
- How to Have a Metalinguistic Dispute ±
2021. Synthese. 199: 5603–5622.
There has been recent interest in the idea that speakers who appear to be having a verbal dispute may in fact be engaged in a metalinguistic negotiation: they are communicating information about how they believe an expression should be used. For example, individuals involved in a dispute about whether a racehorse is an athlete might be communicating their diverging views about how 'athlete' should be used. While many have argued that metalinguistic negotiation is a pervasive feature of philosophical and everyday discourse, the literature lacks an account of this phenomenon that can be situated within a 'mainstream' view of communication. I propose an independently motivated account where individuals reconstruct metalinguistic propositions by means of a pragmatic, Gricean reasoning process.
- 'Quantifier Variance' is Not Quantifier Variance ±
2021. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 99 (3): 611-627.
There has been recent interest in the idea that, when metaphysicians disagree over the truth of (say) 'There are numbers' or 'Chairs exist', their dispute is merely verbal. This idea has been taken to motivate quantifier variance, the view that the meanings of quantifier expressions vary across different ontological languages, and each of these meanings is of equal metaphysical merit. I argue that quantifier variance cannot be upheld in light of natural language theorists' analyses of quantifier expressions. The idea that metaphysicians are engaged in verbal disputes can be maintained only through alternative strategies that have nothing to do with quantifier expressions.
- Expressions in Focus ±
2020. Semantics and Pragmatics. 13 (13): 1-46.
It is commonly claimed that, when a constituent is the focus of an occurrence of a sentence, certain alternatives to that constituent are relevant to our understanding of the sentence. Normally these are alternatives to the denotation of the focused constituent. However, Krifka (2007) briefly discusses the notion of expression focus, where the alternatives are linguistic items. Yet an adequate account of expression focus has not been given within the literature. This is despite the fact that it holds the potential to provide analyses of several important metalinguistic phenomena, including metalinguistic negotiation, metalinguistic negation and embedded pejorative expressions. This paper provides an account of expression focus and shows the explanatory power it holds with respect to metalinguistic phenomena.
- Triggering Domain Restriction ±
2019. Mind & Language. 34 (5): 563-584.
It is well known that occurrences of sentences such as ‘Every bottle is empty’ will sometimes be understood relative to a subset of the set of all bottles in the universe. Much has been written about what mechanism should be used to model this phenomenon of domain restriction. However, comparatively little attention has been paid to the question of when domain restriction is triggered. I will begin by challenging a recent partial answer to this question. I will then develop my own partial answer based on observations pertaining to information structure.
University of Bristol
PHILM0021 Epistemology and Metaphysics (Spring 2024)
±
Masters course, covering central issues in contemporary epistemology and metaphysics (composition, vagueness, persistence, modality, etc.).
PHIL30077 Philosophy of Psychology (Spring 2023)
±
Third-year and Masters course, covering topics in the philosophy of psychology (co-taught).
PHIL20017 Philosophy of Language (Autumn 2022/2023/2024)
±
Second-year undergraduate course, covering classic issues (names, definite descriptions, natural kind terms) along with contemporary topics (possible worlds semantics, pragmatics, taste predicates, slurs, experimental linguistics).
PHIL10005 Introduction to Philosophy A (Autumn 2022/2023/2024)
±
First-year undergraduate course, introducing some central problems of epistemology and metaphysics while focusing on texts by Descartes and Hume (co-taught).
University of St Andrews
Basic Logic (Autumn 2018)
±
Non-credit module for MLitt and Conversion Diploma students, covering sentential logic, predicate logic, logical properties, tableaux systems and derivation systems.