From August, I will be a Research Associate on the ERC project 'Truth and Semantics', at the University of Bristol. I am currently a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Salzburg. Previously, I was a postdoctoral research fellow at ArgLab, at the New University of Lisbon. I attained a PhD in Philosophy in October 2018, at the Arché Philosophical Research Center, in the University of St Andrews.

I work primarily on the philosophy of language, semantics and metaphysics. My current research interests include: information structure, quantifier expressions, quantifier variance, verbal and metalinguistic disputes, and semantic paradoxes.



(forthcoming). ''Quantifier Variance' is not Quantifier Variance'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Abstract: There has been recent interest in the idea that, when metaphysicians disagree over the truth of (say) 'There are numbers' or 'Chairs exist', their dispute is merely verbal. This idea has been taken to motivate quantifier variance, the view that the meanings of quantifier expressions vary across different ontological languages, and each of these meanings is of equal metaphysical merit. I argue that quantifier variance cannot be upheld in light of natural language theorists' analyses of quantifier expressions. The idea that metaphysicians are engaged in verbal disputes can be maintained only through alternative strategies that have nothing to do with quantifier expressions.
(2019). 'Triggering Domain Restriction'. Mind & Language. 34(5). pp. 563-584. Abstract: It is well known that occurrences of sentences such as ‘Every bottle is empty’ will sometimes be understood relative to a subset of the set of all bottles in the universe. Much has been written about what mechanism should be used to model this phenomenon of domain restriction. However, comparatively little attention has been paid to the question of when domain restriction is triggered. I will begin by challenging a recent partial answer to this question. I will then develop my own partial answer based on observations pertaining to information structure.


As Instructor

Basic Logic (Autumn 2018) (University of St Andrews) Non-credit module for MLitt and Conversion Diploma students, covering sentential logic, predicate logic, logical properties, tableaux systems and derivation systems.

As Graduate Teaching Assistant

PY2012 Meaning & Knowing (Spring 2017) (University of St Andrews) Second year module covering philosophy of language, including accounts of meaning, analyses of referring terms, and Gricean and Austinian pragmatics; also covering epistemology, including skepticism and testimony.
PY1006 Knowledge & Reasoning (Spring 2015) (University of St Andrews) First year module covering introductory epistemology, with a focus on analyses of knowledge as justified true belief; also covering introductory logic, including propositional logic, predicate logic and natural deduction.
6AANB031 Modal Logic (Spring 2014) (King's College London) Third year module covering modal predicate logic, with a focus on tableaux proofs for theorems, soundness and completeness proofs for logics, and philosophical debates surrounding transworld identity.
4AANA004 Metaphysics 1 (Autumn 2013) (King's College London) First year module covering introductory metaphysics, with a focus on the persistence of objects over time and on personal identity.

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